¿Habrá un Lugar para mi Vida? : ciudades, subjetividades y geografías de resistencia by Savransky, Martin
Athenea Digital - 12(1): 191-206 (marzo 2012) -MATERIALES- ISSN: 1578-8946
Will There Be a Place for my Life?: Cities,
Subjectivities and Geographies of
Resistance 
¿Habrá un Lugar para mi Vida?: Ciudades,
Subjetividades y Geografías de
Resistencia
Martin Savransky
Goldsmiths, University of London
m.savransky@gmail.com
Abstract Resumen
The present paper pursues an encounter between 
pressing questions in both human geography and 
psycho-social  and  cultural  theory,  namely, 
between processes of  subject-formation and the 
production of subjectivity and the way these are 
always  already  emplaced,  enfolded  within  a 
culturally  signified  geography  that  in  turn  they 
come  to  sustain  or  contest  through  different 
means. The argument, or rather, the invitation, is 
that insofar as subjectivities take place, it might be 
promising to regard cities and urban spaces as 
spaces of subjectivation. Thus, firstly, the question 
of how it is we come to engender a subjectivity is 
posed  and  addressed  following  performativity 
theory. Secondly, some of the implications of the 
proposed notion of ‘spaces of subjectivation’ are 
stressed and a theoretical  case of  abject  urban 
spaces  is  analysed.  Finally,  the  question  of 
resistance and the possibility of contesting those 
geographies  of  subjectivation  through 
geographies of resistance is posed and a possible 
approach is offered. 
El  presente  texto  persigue  un  encuentro  de  
cuestiones  de  relevancia  en  los  campos  de  la  
geografía  humana  y  la  teoría  psico-social  y  
cultural, es decir, un encuentro entre procesos de  
formación de la subjetividad y las formas en que  
estos  se  encuentran  emplazados,  envueltos  en  
una  geografía  cargada  de  significaciones  
culturales,  que  estos  mismos  procesos  
contribuyen  a  sostener  o  a  contestar.  El  
argumento,  o  mejor,  la  invitación  del  presente  
texto  consiste  en  la  propuesta  de  reflexionar  
sobre  el  emplazamiento  de  la  formación  de  la  
subjetividad a través de concebir las ciudades y  
los espacios urbanos como espacios constitutivos  
de  esa  formación,  es  decir  como  espacios  de  
subjetivación.  En  primer  lugar,  entonces,  la  
cuestión  de  cómo  llegamos  a  habitar  una  
subjetividad  es  planteada  y  abordada  desde  la  
perspectiva de la teoría de la performatividad. En  
segunda instancia, algunas de las implicaciones  
de  la  noción  de  “espacios  de  subjetivación”  
propuesta son señalados,  y  un caso teórico de  
espacios  urbanos  abyectos  es  analizado.  
Finalmente,  se  plantea  la  problemática  de  la  
resistencia  y  la  posibilidad  de  contestar  
geografías  de  subjetivación  a  través  de  
geografías de resistencia es valorada e ilustrada.
Keywords: Geography;  Subjectivity;  Performativity; 
Escape; Tactics
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Introduction: Psycho-Social Theory, Performativity and the 
Question of the Subject
Among the myriad of pressing questions that have haunted (psycho-)social and cultural theory for the last  
decades, what we could call ‘the question of the subject’ is certainly deserving of a special emphasis. 
Indeed, an innumerable amount of challenges have been put forth to the Cartesian subject, insofar as it is  
no longer  tenable  that  subjects  be  autonomous and self-sufficient,  clearly  split  in  mental  and bodily  
dimensions, possessing both an interiority and a relation to an outside; a rational being that can finally  
address with certainty that ‘“I” am’. 
Thus, since Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1996, p. 29) “there is no doer behind the deed” via Michel Foucault’s 
Panopticon  (1975/1991),  a  whole  genealogy  of  thought  throughout  the  twentieth  century  has  been 
concerned with challenging the multiplicity of assumptions that the Cartesian notion of subjectivity entails. 
As Vikki Bell (2007, p. 11) argues:
[t]here is no resolution of doubt, no passage into certainty, because the subject is itself  
a  locus  of  effects  of  his  or  her  surroundings.  That  is,  the  subject  is  produced  by 
historically varying conditions that are in turn sustained by their produced elements. 
Thus, instead of a rational, self-contained, autonomous subject we encounter a subject as an effect of the 
entanglements  or  foldings  of  history  and  power  (see  for  instance  Deleuze,  1986/2006).  Indeed,  we 
encounter a subject for which ‘thinking’ as such no longer allows for the certainty of being, for it only  
provides the possibility of relating to oneself within the limits of certain discursive and symbolic conditions, 
certain ‘régimes of truth’, in Foucault’s terms, that constrain the ways in which we may relate to and think 
about ourselves but also stand as the very condition of possibility for the enunciation of an “I” (Butler,  
1997a). Indeed, as Judith Butler (2004a, p. 28) argues, thinking about how a subject is formed is thinking  
about “the ways in which we are, from the start and by virtue of being a bodily being, already given over,  
beyond ourselves, implicated in lives that are not our own.” As Julian Henriques, Wendy Hollway, Cathy 
Urwin, Couze Venn & Valerie Walkerdine (1984) argued in a seminal paper on subjectivity and psycho-
social  studies,  the  notion  of  subjectivity  involves  both  an intimate  relation  to  oneself  and a  form of 
submission to an order that makes that very first relation of intimacy possible. Subjects, thus, are formed 
through the ways in which power acts upon bodies: “[p]ower not only acts on a subject but, in a transitive 
sense, enacts the subject into being. As a condition, power precedes the subject.” (Butler, 1997a, p. 13).  
Being a subject is thus not so much a form of being, but a permanent form of becoming, a process that at 
the same time requires and conceals its own temporality and its own beginnings (Butler, 1990/1999).
The understanding of this temporality, or what recently has been called, ‘subjective time’ (Papoulias &  
Callard, 2010) is, I would argue, of extreme importance when addressing the question of the subject, for  
although we might agree that subjects are always already entangled within a historical configuration of  
power  relations  that  make them possible  and  also  constrain  them in  different  ways,  and insofar  as  
inhabiting a subjectivity is not an ontological statement, that is, it is not a form of being, but rather, a 
process  of  becoming,  how  exactly  does  this  process  of  subject-formation  happen?  How  does  one  
become a subject?
Insofar as any explanation of this process not only attempts to respond to the question posed immediately  
above but  also,  and in so doing,  always invokes a genealogy of  intellectual  debates and theoretical 
positions around this question, this paper does not attempt to give a comprehensive response to this 
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question but one among many others (for a more comprehensive map of different positions around the 
notion of the subject, and moreover, a map that was constructed with geographical notions in mind, see 
Pile & Thrift, 1995; see also Lash, 1984). Namely, the assumption that makes this paper possible is one 
by which the subject comes into being through a reiterative process of citation and enactment of the 
cultural and social (and spatial, as I will try to show) norms that make her life possible in both corporeal  
and cultural terms (Butler, 1993). Subjects come into being through the reiterative performance of norms. 
As Judith Butler (1993, p. 15, emphasis on original) argues:
[t]he process of sedimentation or what we might call  materialization  will be a kind of 
citationality, the acquisition of being through the citing of power, a citing that establishes 
an originary complicity in the formation of the “I” .
Thus, contrary to sociological and social psychological theories of socialization, we do not encounter a 
subject that internalises a set of norms that lie outside her, as if she was already there from the start, 
indeed, as if the epistemic trope of her formation were that of an ‘encounter’ between subjectivity and 
culture.  Instead,  the “I”  that  articulates the grammatical  inflection of  a  relation to  oneself,  that  is,  of  
subjectivity itself, is a bodily “I” that becomes continuously materialised through a temporal process of 
mimesis  of  constitutive and regulatory  norms of  being that  make that  subjectivity  intelligible within  a 
historical period and within a set of cultural conventions. In other words, subject-formation is a process of 
practice and repetition, of repetitive practices that form the one claiming authority over those practices. 
The importance of temporality becomes salient once we recognize that,  albeit  produced as effects of  
power, subjects are never ‘perfect examples of the law’, that is, they are not completely determined by the 
power formations that made them possible in the first place, but are able to resist, re-appropriate, and fail 
to  reproduce  the  norms that  constitute  them as such  –although not  without  undergoing  the  risks  of 
becoming unintelligible– (Butler, 1993). It is in the re-production of normative conventions outside their 
conventional frameworks, indeed, outside there conventional bodily materialisations, that the relationship 
between subjects and norms becomes not only reproductive, but also creative, productive, subversive 
and political.
The subject of contemporary (psycho-)social theory is thus a subject that becomes gendered, racialised,  
classed, etc., by a repetitive acting that takes the form of a citation of the very norms that at a given time  
regulate gender, ‘race’, and class distinctions. Indeed, a world of literature on specific becomings and 
subject-formations has found place in the last decades, across disciplines. We have been acquainted with 
the ways in which bodily subjects materialise through the citation of gender norms (Butler, 1990/1999;  
1993;  2004b),  through  the  regulatory  formations  of  ‘race’  (see  for  instance  Bhabha,  1994;  Fanon, 
1952/2008; Gilroy, 1993; Hall, 1990), the production of class (see Adkins & Skeggs, 2004; Skeggs, 2003),  
and also through slightly more specific formations such as the education system (see for example Davies 
et al.,  2001; Walkerdine, 1990), institutionalised psychology and psychotherapy (Foucault, 1976/1998; 
Rose, 1996), and, most famously, the system of imprisonment and confinement of ‘deviancy’ (Foucault,  
1975/1991), among others.
The present paper –although clearly and crucially inscribed within this tradition of thought– is an attempt 
to point out the fact that, despite Foucault’s (1975/1991) genealogy of imprisonment and punishment is,  
as  Edward  Soja  (1989)  has  cleverly  remarked,  a  ‘spatial  historiography’,  in  that  the  architectural  
configuration of the prison, the distribution of in/visibility that it allows, and the cultural significations that 
are attached to it, render space a central element in the question of subjectivation, we could argue that, 
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comparatively, less theoretical attention within this intellectual geneaology has been paid to the ways in 
which subjects are spatially subjectified (certain texts within post-colonial theory and diaspora studies are  
of course important exceptions, see for instance Bhabha, 1994; Gilroy, 1993; Yiftachel, 2010; there is 
also a number of urban and cultural  anthropologists that  do deal with this question albeit  somewhat  
differently: see Delgado, 2007; also see Kanna, 2010). By this I mean the ways in which subjectivation 
takes place within certain spatial formations, and moreover, the ways in which this formations of space 
are always already embedded with cultural significations and norms and thus contribute to the formation 
of emplaced subjectivities. 
Thus, in the following section I will attempt to argue for a way of thinking the link between subjectivity and 
urban spaces, more specifically, cities1 –in their entirety or in parts– as spaces of subjectivation. Thinking 
with and against the work of scholars who have aimed at dealing with both the spatiality of the psyche  
and the psychic life of space, I will argue that the formation of subjectivities is always already produced in 
space and also producing space through the very enactment and materialisation of bodies and subjects 
within culturally signified urban spaces, and that, as such, more attention needs to be paid to the way in 
which cultural norms operate through space by embedding urban texture with cultural significations and 
normative imperatives. After this main argument of the paper is presented, I will focus on the ways in 
which subjects might resist or critically and creatively engage with those very normative formations of  
space  that  make  emplaced  subjectivities  possible.  More  concretely,  following  the  work  of  Sandro 
Mezzadra (2005),  I  will  draw on one possible  ‘tactic’  (see De Certau,  1984) by which resistance to  
normative subjection in cities might be accomplished, namely, by an act of escape. 
Will there be a place for my life?: Cities, Abjection and Situating Subjectivation
As I have argued above, the question of subjectivity in contemporary (psycho-)social and cultural theory 
is a question not of  what subjects  are but of  how one  becomes  a subject. Subjectivity is a process of 
becoming.  Moreover,  following  the  tradition  of  thought  on  subjectivation  that  is  now  known  as  
performativity  theory (for  a  fascinating  overview  see  Bell,  2007),  I  have  argued  that  to  think  about 
subjectivity as a process of becoming, or in other words, to think about subjectivation, is to interrogate the  
ways in which cultural norms are inscribed into bodies through a process of repetitive citation of those 
norms, a process that insofar as it engenders intelligible subjectivities, it institutes certain forms of life and 
precludes others. Indeed, the question of an intelligible life is at the centre of this whole problematic: 
which lives can be lived and which lives remain utterly unlivable within a certain cultural and historical 
present? 
In a recent reflection on this issue, Judith Butler (2004b, p. 2-3, emphasis added) frames the question of  
becoming a (gendered) subject in the following way:
If I am a certain gender, will I still be regarded as part of the human? Will the “human” 
expand to include me in its reach? If I desire in certain ways, will I be able to live? Will  
1 In the present text, an analytical distinction between “urban spaces” and “cities” is made, one that, moreover, will let 
us think the latter through the former, namely, by understanding the former as the lived space were urban bodily 
experience takes place, and the latter by an abstraction of those spaces through geographical organization. Although 
the following exceeds the scope of this paper, this distinction allows as well for an interesting comparative question 
between the internal cultural-spatial heterogeneity of a city and its outer ‘image’, the one it projects to the outside, 
and the sort of subjections to that cultural connotation of the city as a whole that might be created when a subject is  
discursively situated as a inhabitant of that city in a diasporic encounter.
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there be a place for my life, and will it be recognizable to others upon whom I depend 
for social existence?
Indeed, this is a rich and complex set of questions for it establishes and intimate relation between forms 
of subjectivity and a normative notion of who counts as human, and ultimately, who, as human, is allowed 
to live and who is excluded from the living. It also suggests the important extent to which subjectivation is  
not a question of fashionable self-making, as some postmodern thinking would have it, but a matter of  
survival (see Bell, 1999; 2008) and thus, how thinking about subjectivation is to be regarded as a form of 
ethical and political thought about the ways in which certain lives are made possible while others are left 
without a place. But what, for the present paper, seems to me to be of great help in this quotation is the 
way in which the question of subjectivation is itself posed as a question of there being a place for “my” 
life. Indeed, one could argue, a spatial logic is always already at work in the theoretical reflections upon 
subjectivity. But I think this is only partially the case. Let me explain, briefly.
The place to which Butler is alluding to here is, most certainly, a metaphoric place constituted through the 
cultural  expansion  of  the normative constraints  upon any notion of  the ‘human’,  the expansion  of  a 
cultural  space  whereby  desiring  subjects  can  be  allocated  in  their  multiplicity,  without  reducing  that 
multiplicity to forms of heterosexism and without expelling from that ‘place’ those who desire in ways 
other than what the hetero-normative régime of subjectivity allows. 
And indeed it has been often the case that, on the one hand, theories of subject-formation have paid less  
attention to the ways in which subjectivities become possible through their specific localizations in certain 
places, or how space is embedded with cultural significations and norms to such an extent that the bodies 
that  inhabit,  walk  through,  live  in,  and  perform  daily  activities,  therefore  (re)producing  those  spatial  
formations, end up embodying those significations. With the exception of some important insights in Post-
colonial Studies, Diaspora Studies, and Urban Anthropology, where the question of migration and travel,  
and  therefore,  some  notion  of  space,  becomes  relevant  when  thinking  diasporic  and  post-colonial  
subjectivities, few theoretical studies of subject-formation or urban theory engage with the way in which 
urban life-forms are made possible through normative codifications of space (cf. Delgado, 2007; for an 
extended argument around this issue see Pile, 1996). On the other hand, although one could engage with 
hundreds  of  empirical  studies  of  urban  life  and  read  them  through  the  lens of  subjectivation  and 
performativity, very few of those studies actually adopt such a lens themselves (for some recent and 
interesting exceptions see Pine, 2010; Platt, 2011). 
Thus, my invitation reads: what if one where to spatialise Butler’s aforementioned question? Indeed, if  
‘place’ in her question is a metaphor for the relative expansion of cultural intelligibility, how could one 
think about non-metaphoric places, or more concretely, urban spaces and their relationship to forms of 
subjectivity? Perhaps the question could read as follows: Will there be a place for my life  here/there? 
Indeed, this addition of an indexical of place to the question of subjectivation immediately points to the 
need to  situate the formation of subjectivity. Thus, my argument is that in the same way that gender,  
class, ethnic and other differences open up cultural ‘places’ for the habitation of subjectivities, cities and 
neighborhoods are also embedded in cultural significations through which constitutive norms circulate 
and mark the bodies that inhabit them in different ways. As Steve Pile (2005, p.3) argues somewhat 
differently in the introduction to his Real Cities: 
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[s]omething about  city  life  lends itself  to  being read as if  it  had a state  of  mind,  a 
personality, as having a particular mood or sentiment, or as privileging certain attitudes 
and forms of sociation. It is quite clear that New York is not New Orleans, that London is 
not  Singapore,  that  Paris is not  Berlin.  For sure,  this has something to do with the 
buildings: with their built form their super-structures and infrastructures of the city. For 
sure,  it  has something to do with the way people live their  lives in cities,  with their 
cultures  and  customs,  with  how  they  treat  strangers,  with  their  differences  and 
indifferences.
Thus, insofar as the formation of subjectivities takes place, it follows that there must be a where in which 
this taking place occurs, and that, in an important sense, this where might be related to forms of urbanity. 
As Ash Amin & Stephen Graham (1997, p. 420) note, contemporary cities are “complex performative 
arenas where relational webs weave layers of order between heterogeneous social groups, filières of 
firms, governance agencies, etc.” Thus, following Pile, I suggest we can think the ways in which cities  
become spaces of subjectivation –and indeed, they become subjects themselves (see Pile, 2005)– both 
through a spatial or architectural logic, or through its ‘buildings’,  and through the way in which certain 
forms of life –and all the practices involved in “living” in (parts of) a city, such as moving, using public or 
private transportation, frequenting certain public and private places as a result of one’s own residential or  
work location, engaging in forms of spatial discursive interactions, etc.–, certain modalities of subjectivity,  
or what he calls ‘attitudes and forms of sociation’ are privileged while others are projected to an outside. 
What  we  are  arguing  for  here  is  of  course  not  an  innovation  but  an  additive  invitation  to  connect  
performative theories of subjectivity to an already significant line of interrogating space. In this sense,  
marxist thinkers such as Frederic Jameson (1992), Edward Soja (1989; 2000) and David Harvey (1990) 
have most  famously  analysed the ways in  which post-fordist  forms of  production have induced new 
architectural forms, new urbanization and urban design strategies. In turn, this are said to contribute to 
the production of fragmented spaces and thus to the enfolding of these spaces into forms of postmodern 
subjectivity. 
On the other hand, studies in urban sociology and in discursive social and environmental psychology 
(Aiello  &  Bonaiuto,  2003;  Di  Masso,  2007;  Dixon,  2001;  Dixon  &  Durrheim,  2000;  2004;  Stokoe  & 
Wallwork,  2003;  Wacquant,  2007)  have  provided  interesting  accounts  of  how  people  use  spatial  
significations and metaphors discursively to regulate social relations and notions of place-identity. 
Even  though  these  are  all  highly  valuable  accounts  of  how  subjects  are  inscribed  through  spatial 
formations and how they manage spatial logics and discourses in the production of self/other distinctions  
and also, in the productions of  insides and outsides, I believe an account focused on the processes of 
subject-formation might  help as a supplement,  if  not a partial overcoming, of some of the limitations  
presented by other approaches. Let me sketch these limitations briefly.
On the one hand, when we regard the literature concerning the relationship between economic relations 
of production, architectural forms and types of subjectivity, I would argue that what is basically lacking in 
this conception is, namely, a theory of subject-formation through the incorporation of norms. In these  
texts, it is often the case that the link between these elements is read only in cultural and political terms,  
and although the correlation between forms of urbanisation and forms of life is succinctly stressed, the  
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psychic and bodily processes through which urban forms come to shape subjective realities remain rather 
unspecified. 
On the other hand, regarding the second body of literature just presented, the focus on the pragmatics of  
discourse and the public displays of spatial metaphors, although extremely valuable for an analysis of ‘the 
politics of place’ and the ways in which subjects negotiate spatial identities, it often ends up presenting 
the formations of subjectivity as a form of ‘management’ of discourse about self and others. Thus, it often 
neglects the way in which norms not only may be negotiated by means other than those of discursive 
interaction but also, and of equal importance, how they are constitutive of subjects themselves, that is, 
the way in which the spatial inscription of norms is constitutive of what kinds of subjects are possible in a  
given spatial formation, and thus, the extent to which those inscriptions are not always readily open to 
being spoken about, ‘managed‘ and pragmatically negotiated without the risk of becoming unintelligible, 
of making one’s life utterly unliveable (see Adams, 2010).
In this regard, I believe one interesting example to start thinking about the ways in which the cultural 
significations of urban spaces inscribe bodily subjects through a process of performativity, and albeit it 
shares some of the difficulties mentioned aboveARTÍCULOS, is Loïc Wacquant’s (2007) notion, following 
the work of Erving Goffman (1963), of “territorial stigmatisation”. In his account, what Wacquant names 
“advanced marginality”, which, among other aspects, entails a “functional disconnection of dispossessed 
neighbourhoods from the national and global economies, and the reconfiguration of the welfare state into 
an instrument for enforcing the obligation of paid work in the polarizing city” (2007, p. 67), adopts a spatial 
logic through the inscription of ‘penalised spaces’ which induce a form of ‘territorial  infamy’ by which  
certain marginal urban spaces2 at the heart of the contemporary metropolis become the site of inscription 
of cultural significations of abjection, guilt and shame. Although Wacquant (2007, p. 67) aligns “territorial  
stigmatisation”  with  Goffman’s  stigma  category  of  “race,  nation  and  religion”  instead  of  that  of 
“abominations  of  the  body”  or  “blemishes  of  individual  character”,  his  following  description  of  the 
strategies of disidentification and disavowal used by inhabitants of such spaces shows how territorial  
stigmatisation attaches itself to embodied subjectivities in significant ways:
People there [i.e. inhabitants of stigmatised territories] commonly hide their addresses, 
avoid having family and friends visit them at home, and feel compelled to make excuses 
for residing in an infamous locale that stains the image they have of themselves. (2007, 
p. 68)
Although Wacquant moves rapidly into a consideration of how subjects ‘manage’ this spatial stigma, and 
thus argues that, as such, and unlike the other stigmas of “nation, race and religion”, this one can be  
“quite easily dissimulated and attenuated –even annulled – through geographic mobility” (2007, p. 67)3, I 
believe this celebration of ‘management’ needs to be deferred and that a more thorough exploration of 
2 Some of the examples given are La Courneuve in Toulouse, South Central Los Angeles, The Bronx in New York, 
Neuköln in Berlin, and one could easily think of others such as El Raval or Santa Coloma in Barcelona, Seven 
Sisters, Brixton and the far South in London, or the Shanty-town “Villa 31” in Buenos Aires, etc.
3 Although in the next section I will argue with Mezzadra (2005) that geographic mobility, or what he calls “exercising 
the right to escape”, might be regarded as a way of resisting the subjectifying effects of urban space, such possibility 
remains far from being “quite easily” dissimulated, attenuated, or annulled. It rather implies the taking up of a critical 
and spatial distance with regards to a certain space of subjectivation and, at the same time, the taking of a risk  
towards inhabiting new spaces that might have less damaging subjectifying effects, a risk that always entails the 
possibility of becoming unintelligible.
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the constitutive nature of such an abject signification of place in the production of subjectivity is called for.  
Indeed, the inhabiting of a stigmatised territory follows and haunts the subject while within and outside her  
neighbourhood, forms part of an abject site of her subjectivity, a part of herself that needs to be covered, 
concealed, even expelled, hidden from the view of others (see Kristeva, 1984). Indeed, inhabitants of  
stigmatised neighbourhoods become  subjects of  that space and, as such, are subjected to the spatial 
norms that form and distribute a whole geography of subjectivity among the different sites of an urban 
territory. They do not only perform daily bodily and discursive practices that directly relate to the space  
they inhabit  –locating their  ‘home’  within  it,  doing daily  shopping,  frequenting certain  bars and other 
leisure places, interacting with neighbours, learning how to move around the area, and so on– thereby  
enacting and incorporating the spatial norms at stake, shaping their spatial behaviour and subjectivity, 
they also, as it were, bring those significations with them in their mundane intra-city mobilities that are  
prompted by contemporary forms of economic geography – Wacquant’s example of hiding or showing 
their address in a job interview is for this respect a quite telling one. 
Moreover, if we take into account that the abjection of such spaces is “superimposed on the already  
existing stigmata traditionally associated with poverty and ethnic origin or postcolonial immigrant status, 
to which it is closely linked but nor reducible” (Wacquant, 2007, p. 67), we can begin to realise that the  
production  of  subjects  through the  spatial  inscription  of  norms is  not  just  a  question  of  discursively  
managing our public identity and concealing where we come from, but a bodily inscription that reinforces 
a somatic norm related to the racial regulations of the occupation of urban spaces (Puwar, 2004). The 
cultural significations of an abject urban space become attached to bodies that carry those significations 
and that,  in turn, become sites of abjection themselves (for a vividly first-person account see Fanon, 
1952/2008). 
Furthermore, I believe that Wacquant’s rapidity in pointing towards resisting these place-identifications 
misses yet another point. In his account of the strategies of disavowal quoted above, the sort of subject 
that is implicitly invoked is a form of autonomous subject, even an adult subject, insofar as she inhabits 
that territory ‘alone’ –without friends or family–. But as we know, this if often not the case. Entire families  
may  reside  in  these  areas  –as  do  in  others–,  and  other  forms  of  primary  complicities  and  
interdependencies might be produced in such a way that this abject urban spaces stand in a much more  
ambivalent relation to those subjects than that suggested by Wacquant, namely, as a simple burden to  
the subject’s “image” of herself. What is missing here is, significantly, the extent to which, from the outset,  
this  kind of  territories,  as spaces of  subjectivation,  are  also the conditions of  possibility  for forms of 
subjectivity that are not possible elsewhere and that, in bringing subjects to life, they become the very  
origin,  indeed,  a  spatial  point  of  departure  for  the  subject  who then  might  or  might  not  be  able  to  
pragmatically rearticulate its own formation into other, perhaps socially preferred,  narrative terms, for  
“[t]he one story that the “I” cannot tell is the story of its own emergence as an “I” who not only speaks but  
comes to give an account of itself” (Butler, 2005, p.66). 
Thus, to regard cities, and certain urban spaces within them as spaces of subjectivation is to think about 
the ways in which subjectivities are produced through regulatory schemes of space and place, both in its 
material  and  architectural  formations  and  also  in  the  cultural  significations  in  which  spaces  are 
embedded. The focus on subject-formation in relation to urban spaces, thus, also allows us to think of the 
way in which both abject spaces and those regarded as “normal”,  that is, those instituting the spatial  
norm,  remain in  a  relation  of  ambivalence toward  the  subjectivities they  engender,  constraining  and 
marking the bodies that inhabit them in limiting and sometimes damaging ways, but also enabling forms 
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of life that have been precluded from other sites. The attention to the constitutive, bodily and lived nature  
of such processes, doubtless, renders the possibility  of “managing” one’s own subjectivity and public 
identity much more problematic and, indeed, difficult than other approaches have implicitly suggested.
However, this does not mean that resistance is out of the picture. In the following section, I will focus on 
the forms in which a certain resistance to citing the norms of power might be exerted, how a critical 
subjectivity might be brought into being out of such resisting practices, and what it might entail for thinking 
what Steve Pile & Michael Keith (1997) have called “geographies of resistance”. 
Geographies of Resistance: Subjectivity, Tactics of Counter-
Mapping, and the Right to Escape
The question of whether effective resistance against the inciting forces of subjectivation can be exerted is,  
needless to say, an open question.  Depending on the intellectual  genealogy one is informed by, the 
possibility of an emerging agency may appear unimaginable, for, if power is what forms the subject, and 
that subject constitutes itself through an acting that  is power (Butler, 1993), then the re-articulation of 
resisting practices against those forces that constitute the subject might seem impossible, or at least, the 
cost of it would seem to be the very possibility of subjectivity itself. 
In  this  sense,  for  instance,  the kind of  governmentality  critique developed by Nikolas Rose (see for 
instance, 1996) and others, one which Critical Psychology has certainly embraced as its own, rests upon 
the assumption that the only way to theorise social change without falling back into dualisms of all kinds 
and without reintroducing that safe interiority inside the head of individuals, is to explain social change by 
means of simultaneous technologies of subjectivation that may produce competing forms of subjectivity.  
Thus, whenever we think we are seeing an act of resistance, what we really see is another force, another 
power formation (for a critical account of the attitude with which this sort of thinking exercises critique see 
Stengers, 2008). However, as Steve Brown & Paul Stenner (2009) have convincingly argued, this kind of 
work draws upon a very selective reading of Foucault, one which does not account for ways in which 
subjects may deal with normativity in more creative ways.
The  tradition  of  thought  on  subject-formation  that  I  have  tried  to  put  forth  here,  namely,  that  of 
performativity theory, allows more space for thinking the possibility of resistance. Indeed, resistance is 
always what haunts, with every repetition, with every act, the very process of subject-formation. Insofar as 
the formation of subjectivity is co-extensive with history but unfolds itself –or perhaps, enfolds itself– in 
what, following Constantina Papoulias & Felicity Callard (2010), we have called “subjective time”, that is, 
the time of lived experience, subjectivation is a temporal process of reiteration or iteration (Derrida, 1988) 
of norms that come to produce an intelligible “I”. The possibility of resistance within performativity theory 
lies within the logic of that reiteration, namely, in the fact that, albeit brought about as a mimesis, every 
act of repetition has to be made anew, and in each act there is the possibility of failing to comply to the 
rule  one  was supposed to  mime,  but  also  of  engaging  with  norms in  critical  ways,  namely,  by  the 
subversion of the constraints of citation itself, by miming the conventional formulae in non-conventional 
ways  and  thus  re-appropriating  the  very  performance  that,  therefore,  no  longer  stages  a  scene  of 
reproduction:  “[t]he possibility  of  a resignification of  that  ritual  is based on the prior  possibility  that  a 
formula can break with its originary context, assuming meanings and functions for which it was never 
intended.” (Butler, 1997b, p. 147). In this sense, if at the beginning of this essay we stated that subject-
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formation was an ongoing process of practice and repetition, what this section invites us to consider is,  
thus, the extent to which subject-formation is always already a process of differentiation.
The conception of resistance just outlined here bares some interesting similarities with Michel de Certau’s 
(1984) spatial characterisation of power and resistance in terms of strategies and tactics. In his account,  
strategies are rationalisations of power that “seek first of all to distinguish [their] ‘own’ place, that is, the  
place of its own power and will,  from an environment.” (1984, p. 36). This of course gives power the 
“mastery of places through sight” allowing for a field of visibility that “can transform foreign forces into  
objects that can be observed and measured, and thus control and ‘include’ them with its scope of vision” 
(1984, p. 36). 
By contrast, a tactic is “a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. [...] The space of 
a tactic is the space of the other” (1984, p. 37). This non-place of tactics does not necessarily pose a 
problem to resistance for,  “[t]his nowhere gives a tactic mobility,  to be sure, but a mobility that must  
accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing possibilities that offer themselves at 
any given moment” (p.37). Thus, a tactic is an art of twisting the game of power in the very space of  
power, it is about:
vigilantly mak[ing] use of the crack that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance 
of proprietary powers. It poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it 
is least expected. It is a guileful ruse. (p. 37).
Moreover, Pile (1997, p 16) suggests that, at first glance, de Certau’s distinction is 
suggesting that the powerful control space and that resistance can do no more than act 
out  of  place,  but  it  can also be argued that  tactics  or  resistance have at  least  two 
‘surfaces’: one facing towards the map of power, the other facing in another direction, 
towards tangible, invisible, unconscious desires, pleasures, enjoyments, fears, angers 
and hopes – the very stuff of politics.
Thus, the resistance of subjectivation through spatial means is about slipping through the cracks of the  
spatial grid of power not only to subvert that very grid and prevent it from occupying its own shadows but  
also by projecting our desire elsewhere, or indeed, by gradually transforming the apparent symbolic fixity  
of the map through the surreptitious insinuation of counter-mapping. Among these tactics of counter-
mapping is of course the tactic of geographical mobility. How is geographical mobility, most often also  
migration, a spatial tactic of resistance to a space of subjectivation?
Indeed, if the question seems rather counter-intuitive at first, this is probably due to the way in which  
mainstream  research  on  migration  studies  has  tried  to  account  for  why  people  move.  Thus,  what 
Mezzadra (2005) calls the new orthodoxy  on migrations, that is, the ʻ ʼ new economics of migration (see for 
instance Portes 1997), stresses that human mobilities are primarily determined by objective economic 
factors and by influence of family and communitarian networks . We are used to understanding “theʻ ʼ  
problem of” migration as a kind of forced or induced movement due to catastrophic economic conditions, 
and therefore strip the migrant subject of any political valence by converting her into the ideal –but also 
often impossible– subject of the welfare state. 
As Mezzadra (2005) points out, there are at least three issues that are neglected or misguiding in this 
approach.  First  of  all,  the  new economics perspective is marked by a “reference to migrations as a 
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confirmation  of  the  increasing  social  mobility  that  would  characterise  the  capitalist  system and  the 
american citizenship” (Mezzadra, 2005, p. 146. Own translation). Thus, processes of stigmatisation and 
discrimination that  are  emphatically  stressed  within  this  discourse,  tend to  be regarded as  collateral 
effects of capitalism, which are never really put into question (see also Savransky, 2011).
Secondly,  this  approach  tends  to  strip  away  all  political  and  social  confrontations  from the  process 
migration and these are rendered as simple dependent variables of a fundamentally commercial  modelʻ ʼ  
of citizenship (Honig, 2001).
Finally, they leave out the subjective determination and relative autonomy of migration as the exercise 
and performance of a right to escape , as a refusal to be subjected to a given space and to a certainʻ ʼ  
labour culture through the act of fugue. On the contrary, and in Mezzadra s own terms (2005, p. 144,ʼ  
emphasis in original.  Own translation.),  the [perspective of the]  ʻ autonomy of migrations  refers to the 
surplus of subjective practices and demands that find expression in migratory movements in relation to 
the objective practices that determine themʼ.
Against the privileging of ‘objective causes’ for the explanation of migration, Mezzadra (2004, p. 270. 
emphasis in original. Own translation) invites us to:
underline the fact that for migrations to exist, there must be an individual motion (made 
concretely by a concrete woman or man, embedded in family and social ‘networks’, but 
nonetheless  capable  of  agency)  of  desertion  from the  field  where  those  ‘objective 
causes’ operate, a reclaiming precisely of a ‘right to escape’, which even if most of the 
time unconsciously, constitutes a material critique of the international division of labour 
and marks profoundly the subjectivity of the migrant also in the country where she/he 
chooses to settle down.
This notion of autonomy and escape, however, remains in sharp contrast to any heroic notion of the 
migrant  subject  or  any  postmodern  celebration  of  nomadism  for  as  Mezzadra  (2005,  p.  16.  Own 
translation)  stresses,  “[i]n  this  research  [...]  the  possibility  of  talking  of  a  subject  in  ‘heroic’  terms is  
criticised from the very beginning and attention is given to the sum of processes of subjectivation that 
form the texture of social relations”. Thus, Mezzadra presents us with an account of migrant subjectivities 
that escape a certain space of subjectivation as a means of resisting pervasive subjectifying conditions, 
while, as it is clearly stated in the quote above, this does not imply any form of heroism nor a pure self-
determination but a subject that is herself possible by means of those same social conditions that wishes  
to overcome. Thus, in every tactic of resistance, in every act of counter-mapping and escape, there is a 
risk of loosing oneself, of remaining unintelligible, or, to continue with the metaphors of visibility, a risk of  
being unable to come back to light. 
In the process of escaping, indeed a tactic of counter-mapping through geographical mobility, the subject 
is  not  build  anew,  for  that  would  entail,  precisely,  a  moment  of  complete  darkness,  a  leap  into  
unintelligibility and psychosis. On the contrary, “the very social [and urban, we could add] texture of the 
place of origin is modified by new relations that are produced at the place of arrival.” (Mezzadra, 2005, 
p.18. Own translation). Thus, the citing of conventional formulae in clearly unconventional places not only 
allows for the exercise of resistance to the formulae and to the convention of place itself, but in its very  
enactment, it disrupts the convention by subverting its appropriate place of action, and thus produces 
space as a sort of counter-mapping of action and subjectivity, a geography, indeed, of resistant practices.  
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In this way, migration stops being merely a “flow”, determined by economic conditions of a global market  
that  pulls  and pushes world-population around the globe in  accordance  with  its  demands.  Migration  
becomes an assertion of subjectivity in regards to its emplacement, it becomes about the re-making of 
geography through tactics of counter-mapping, or, as Soja (2000, p. 281) would argue, it becomes about  
the very “social production of human spatiality”:
This involvement in producing and in already produced spaces and places is what all  
those  who  are  oppressed,  subordinated,  and  exploited  share,  and  it  is  the  shared 
consciousness  and  practice  of  an  explicitly  spatial  politics  that  can  provide  and 
additional  bonding  force  for  combining  those  separate  channels  of  resistance  and 
struggle that for so long have fragmented modernist equality politics. (Soja, 2000, p. 
281).
Thus, regarding migration, with Mezzadra (2005), as the production of a geography of resistance, allows 
us to fathom ways in which subjectivity, as a permanent becoming, is always an emplaced process, 
formed in, through, and by space as well as forming space through either the re-production of the spatial  
strategies  and  the  mimesis  of  the  spatial  norm,  or  through  exercise  of  resistant  tactics  of  counter-
mapping, dislocation and escape.
Concluding Remarks: On Subjectivity and Other Spaces
In the present paper I have attempted a twofold task. On the one hand, I have intended to approach the  
issue of human geography and the social production of spatiality through the question subject-formation 
or subjectivation. On the other hand, I have tried to emplace the very process of subject-formation in the 
signification  of  urban  spaces  and  places,  by  thinking  them as  spaces  of  subjectivation,  in  order  to 
understand the way in which normative significations of  place become attached to subjectivities and 
bodies, constraining them in relevant ways, and also, simultaneously and paradoxically, enabling them, 
becoming constitutive of subjects themselves, allowing for a place, however abject, for a subject’s life. 
In the process, I hoped to have shown that this way of thinking the relationship between subjectivity and  
spatiality is at the same time informed by and may, in turn, also critically supplement other approaches 
that emphasise different dimensions of that disciplinary intersection between the geographical and the 
psycho-social, space and subjectivity. 
Lastly, I have attempted to approach the question of resistance as regards the subjectifying effects of  
space through a consideration of de Certau’s (1984) distinction between strategies and tactics, and have 
provided an exemplary case to think about geographical mobility as a form of resistance to potentially 
damaging or undesired forms of spatial subjectivation by understanding, with Mezzadra (2004; 2005), the 
subjective determination of migratory movements as acts of escaping certain socio-spatial conditions of 
subject-formation and thus engendering a spatialised critical subjectivity. In doing this, I hope to have 
shown that, as Pile (1997, p. 16, my emphasis) suggests:
[i]f  de Certau is right,  resistance cannot be understood as a face-to-face opposition 
between the powerful and the weak, nor as a fight that takes place only on grounds 
constituted by structural relations – because other spaces are always involved: spaces 
202
Martin Savransky
which are dimly lit, opaque, deliberately hidden, saturated with memories, that echo with 
lost words and the cracked sounds of pleasure and enjoyment.
Thus, the production of these other spaces through a tactic of counter-mapping is also the attempt at re-
making geography, at producing different places for my life, at expanding the spatial boundary whereby 
certain lives are rendered livable while others become utterly unlivable. I repeat, thus, my invitation to 
other researchers and thinkers to continue enquiring in this promising and complex field of interrelation 
and mutuality between the spatial formations of subjectivity and the social production of space. 
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